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Should rights of free expression include anonymous speech?  In our age of post-truth 
and internet trolls Eric Barendt’s brisk and engaging book raises timely questions.   
Disputes about free speech command a wide literature, with Barendt’s Freedom of 
Speech, first published in 2005, now a standard reference.  Anonymous Speech shifts our 
focus from the message to the manner in which it is spoken. As Barendt notes, however, 
disputes about anonymity inevitably bring the message back into the picture. After all, we 
worry about fake news and hate mongering, not anonymous postings of kittens and cupcakes. 
English law distinguishes between higher- and lower-valued speech. Whistle-blowers, for 
example, enjoy greater anonymity than racists (96); an approach Barendt in principle 
endorses.  
The etymology of ‘anonymous’ traces to ‘without a name’. Literal namelessness 
certainly arises, as in the one-in-a-million case where some amnesiac or ‘forest child’ is 
discovered bearing no discernible civil status. But those are not problems of anonymity as 
ordinarily understood in law, which entail precisely the opposite, namely, persons who do 
maintain a registered civil status that they choose to conceal.  The legal concept of anonymity 
presupposes some formally assigned identity, typically recorded on a birth certificate, identity 
card, or passport.   
Anonymous Speech asks to what extent an assumption of anonymity counts among 
our freedoms of speech.  The distinction between speaker and speech becomes crucial.  On 
the English approach, anonymity per se falls outside the legal protection of free speech per 
se. (81)  A speaker’s choice to communicate anonymously commands no greater protection 




than can be justified under a consequentialist balancing test.  When some demonstrable cost 
outweighs any purported benefit, the law may legitimately mandate disclosure of the 
speaker’s identity.  
Several factors guide that test.  One element is motive. In the eighteenth century, 
Cato’s Letters and the Letters of Junius were published pseudonymously to avoid charges of 
seditious libel (37), a crime subsequently abolished in most Western democracies. The Brontë 
sisters adopted pseudonyms because female authorship jeopardised a novel’s success. (17)  
Jane Austen’s writings were attributed to ‘A Lady’ to preserve ‘her character as a kindly aunt 
who seldom voiced serious opinions of her own’. (16)  Such motives for anonymity carry less 
weight today, but others remain. Doris Lessing and JK Rowling, like Anthony Trollope over 
a century earlier, sent anonymous manuscripts to literary agents after they had achieved fame 
under their ordinary names. They sought to be judged on merit rather than reputation (19-22).  
Anonymity may also be chosen out of sheer preference. George Orwell simply disliked his 
birth name, Eric Blair. (21)   
Forms and degrees of anonymity diverge as widely as the motives for it. At one 
extreme, the identities of fully anonymous speakers are known only to themselves. At the 
opposite pole lies the more usual case, namely, no choice at all for anonymity, hence full 
disclosure of one’s officially registered name. Between those two poles we find, for example, 
authors known only to close confidantes, who in turn act as agents between authors and 
publishers. Alternatively, many individuals are known to more arms-length intermediaries, as 
unnamed sources are known to journalists, or whistle-blowers to regulators. Here, anonymity 
merges with confidentiality. (95) Barendt sees a stronger case for anonymity when a third 
party can be held responsible. Authors, whistle-blowers, journalists’ sources, and even 
internet trolls can more credibly claim legal protection once publishers, human resources 
officials, journalists, or website managers assume vicarious liability.  




We can also discern a spectrum of regulation. At one extreme, we can imagine a near-
absolute right of anonymity.  At the opposite extreme, it could be altogether banned.  Neither 
extreme characterises contemporary democracies in practice, though a question for 
comparativists would be to ask where one jurisdiction lies in relation to another.  
For Barendt, rejecting any universal rule, different situations warrant different 
responses.  Despite the variety of scenarios, however, the interests to be balanced are 
relatively few (creating occasional repetitiveness across chapters).  Barendt endorses 
protections of journalists’ sources and whistle-blowers, but would withhold them for 
antisocial expression, such as libel and hate speech. Barendt doubts that speakers have any 
substantial interest in anonymity per se (62-3), and suggests that the interests of audiences are 
more compelling. Whistle-blowing merits a strong presumption in favour of anonymity 
because the public maintains an interest in information claims about professional misconduct 
that might not otherwise surface (68-70).  That same public interest militates against 
anonymity insofar as disclosure may assist audiences in assessing a speaker’s credibility. (66-
68)   
These principles depend, in turn, on context. Media sources, for example, enjoy a 
qualified right to anonymity under English law.  Journalists are charged to act as ‘responsible 
intermediaries’, vouching for their sources’ credibility. (115-9) Journalists are ordinarily 
presumed to perform the task of assessing their source’s reliability.  The law’s background 
assumption is that professions reliant upon good reputation will self-regulate. For Barendt, 
that approach secures a pragmatic balance. It does not dissuade honest sources from 
communicating through journalists; but assuming professional journalists’ overall 
competence, any risk that dishonest or malicious sources might exploit a cloak of anonymity 
is mitigated. In contexts where no responsibly trained intermediary can be assumed, the 
justification for protecting anonymity diminishes. Barendt accepts compulsory disclosure 




when, for example, libels are published on websites that assume no responsibility for their 
content. (147-8) 
Barendt draws illuminating comparisons, notably to the United States, Canada, and 
Germany. Probing the ‘near absolute’ end of the spectrum, he discusses the US Supreme 
Court case of McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission (1995), concerning an anonymous 
leaflet circulated prior to a state referendum. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 
identified two grounds for protecting the author’s anonymity. (56)  First, anonymity protects 
persons seeking to express controversial views, thereby promoting robust political speech.  
Second, authorial identity may form part of a message’s expressive content: the leaflets in 
that case had been signed ‘Concerned Parents and Taxpayers’. Requiring authors to state their 
names equates to forcing them to adopt a substantive viewpoint whilst serving no civic value. 
Justice Scalia retorted in dissent that disclosure plays the overriding civic role of 
promoting accountability. Barendt agrees. As to Stevens’s first, instrumentalist argument, the 
risk of a ‘chilling effect’ on political speech does not automatically outweigh countervailing 
considerations of accountability. Nor does any right of anonymity derive perforce from our 
interests in autonomy (62-3), public participation (66-8), or the audience’s interest in hearing 
views that might not otherwise be expressed. (68-70) Conceding that an author’s name may 
peripherally form part of the content, Barendt nevertheless distinguishes it from the content 
as such.  The latter comprises the ‘information and ideas contained in the work’. (59)  By 
contrast, ‘[t]he use by an author of “Anon” or a pseudonym does not give readers valuable 
information or provide them with ideas […] arguably these devices often deprive them of 
information they value’. (60)  For Barendt, content-based restrictions may impede the 
expression of ideas and information; bans on anonymity do not.   
But is Stevens’s majority opinion so easily answered?  Barendt’s reference to 
‘information’ begs some questions. Political fiction or satire, for example, may certainly 




convey political or social messages without containing ‘information’ in the sense of empirical 
truth-claims.  Central political themes in King Lear concern not literal truth, not ‘information’ 
about dividing up a kingdom, but rather metaphors about the risks of centrally concentrated 
political power.  Had Shakespeare published as a ‘Concerned Citizen’ – which one had every 
reason to be under James I – that identity would surely be bound to the author’s core 
message. Scalia and Barendt do not altogether disagree, but maintain that any such legal 
intrusion is too minimal to impact on the speaker’s core ideas. Yet how minimal is minimal 
in the sphere of political controversy?   
In Cohen v California (1971), the Court held that the US Constitution generally bars 
government from imposing its preferred word choices on open, political speech, even if the 
legal intrusion is negligible. Paul Cohen, protesting the Vietnam war, wore a jacket bearing 
the words ‘Fuck the Draft’ in a local courthouse. By no means challenging Cohen’s rights of 
open dissent, the state would merely have changed a single word. In Wooley v Maynard 
(1977), the Court found that the right of free speech bars government from coercing speakers 
to associate even tangentially with particular messages. Enforced disclosure imposes 
Hobson’s Choice: either state your identity or remain silent. It conjures that spectre of self-
censorship which the Court’s vigilance about government ‘chilling’ of speech has long 
sought to dispel.   
Contemporary literary theorists have probed the porous boundaries between ‘text’ and 
‘para-text’. ‘Text’ signifies the communication as such – a novel, an internet posting, a 
painting, a symphony. ‘Para-text’ denotes elements such as the cover design or advertising.  
Nothing better illustrates the fluidity of that boundary than authorial identity. Anonymity is 
not simply a withholding, not merely a self-effacement: in choosing identities like 
‘Concerned Citizen’ or ‘Anon’, authors affirmatively advertise their choice to conceal their 
identity. Far from being a purely marginal, de minimis adjustment, that choice can frame and 




pervade the entirety of a message.   
Admittedly, authors commonly adopt ordinary-sounding pseudonyms to conceal their 
identities. But even then, consequential choices are made. Female authorship might well have 
diminished the Brontë sisters’ successes, but why did they not then choose, say, ‘Charles’, 
‘Edward’, and ‘Andrew’? The androgynous ‘Currer’, ‘Ellis’, and ‘Acton’ communicate a 
message of their own, hinting at resistance, if not resentment. Para-text blends with text as 
authorial ambiguity fuels textual ambiguity. It cannot be irrelevant to the ‘message itself’ that 
the American Paulette Williams publishes under the African name Ntozake Shange; or that 
the Lithuanian Jew Roman Kacew first became the characteristically French ‘Romain Gary’, 
then published as the more ethnically ambiguous Émile Ajar. From Rosalind in As You Like It 
and Viola in Twelfth Night to Proust and Joyce; from Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of 
Perception to Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, shifting and fragmented identities (nowadays 
further splintered through the proliferation of constructed, cyberspace selves) challenge 
notions of a ‘real’, ontologically fixed identity lurking behind legally registered identities.  
The assumption of ‘genuine’ identity all too readily resembles a Platonic Form, an essential 
truth hovering behind the sheer spectacle of transient, deceptive appearances.  ‘How’, WB 
Yeats famously wondered, ‘can we know the dancer from the dance?’   
We can certainly undertake civil proceedings to change our names and other aspects 
of civil status, including gender. But does formal civil status ‘accurately’ convey an identity 
by reproducing one’s name, birthdate, sex, or other data inscribed on a birth certificate or 
passport?  Is ‘Blair’ the lie concealing the truth of ‘Orwell’? Or precisely the opposite?  There 
is no clean divide between author and authored, between text and para-text. To state, to 
withhold, or to change one’s name are communicative acts. Barendt occasionally recognises 
as much himself.  Risk of arrest originally spurred the anonymity of the street artist Banksy.  
With his fame later secure, however, his cultivated mystique became an identity bound up 




with the art itself. (49-50)  Of course, as Barendt (echoing Scalia) insists, governments 
maintain plausible policy reasons supporting authorial disclosure. The sticking point is 
whether their weighing and balancing of rival interests can so easily proceed on the 
assumption – too often tilting the ‘balance’ to a foregone conclusion – that authorial identity 
remains inherently subordinate to the message ‘itself’.   
Admittedly, we can only push these deconstructions of the concept of personal 
identity so far. Legal systems governing mass societies must, as a practical matter, assume 
stable individual identities. Enforcing contracts, property transactions, or the criminal law 
would turn to farce if breaching parties could claim that it was some ‘other self’ who had, 
say, underwritten a loan or robbed a bank. If the boundaries of individual identity were so 
utterly to collapse, the legal system would collapse with it. To avoid that fate, law preserves 
itself by suspending the presumption of mental capacity: individuals pervasively doubtful 
about their civilly recognised identities, traditionally classified as (something like) 
‘schizophrenics’ or ‘hysterics’, come to serve not as the heightened exemplars of human 
experience portrayed in literary texts, but rather as marginalised deviations from the norm of 
stable, traceable identity. 
Yet why even bother sparring with Stevens when English law is moving in no such 
direction? Jousting matches with the First Amendment lanced by non-Americans whose 
nations face no spectre of ‘free speech Americanisation’ are always intriguing. The tilt is 
heartily pursued, as if one’s national legal system preserves its honour only after taking up 
the First Amendment gauntlet. Could it be that the majority opinion in McIntyre – perhaps 
not absolutist but far more protective of anonymity as germane to expression itself – haunts 
the traditional balancing approaches more than Barendt would wish? Does Stevens’s opinion 
rightly highlight the thin line between, on the one hand, weighing up rival interests, and on 
the other, capitulating to legislators’ and judges’ political preferences, a risk always latent 




within balancing tests? To be fair, Barendt does chastise writers who accept judicial 
balancing uncritically. (109) And yes, risks of bad balancing pervade many areas of law. 
Surely, however, balancing approaches demand exceptional scrutiny when applied to the 
ultimate democratic safeguard, namely, citizens’ core prerogatives of expression within 
public discourse. 
A longstanding aim of limitations on government intrusions into speech has been to 
promote legal clarity so that citizens may confidently enter the public sphere without feeling 
intimidated into self-censoring even legally permissible speech through uncertainty about the 
law.  The more our freedoms of expression come to resemble a baroque statutory code 
understood only by a coterie of specialists, the greater the risk of chilled expression. Serious 
democrats may grudgingly accept the need for seeking expert legal advice on complex tax or 
commercial codes, but must shrink at the prospect of ordinary citizens needing to phone their 
lawyers before expressing themselves in public discourse, or, more likely, staying silent for 
fear of legal consequences. The prospect of chilling legitimately anonymous speech may raise 
greater concerns for democratic legitimacy than Barendt acknowledges – surprisingly, since 
elsewhere Barendt rightly doubts the wisdom of entrusting legislatures and judges with 
discretionary powers over the public conversation. 
A perennial infirmity of balancing tests is that they muddy any criteria for judging 
whether the balance in any particular case has been well struck. Even assuming studious 
case-by-case adjudication, an argument could be made for at least marginally stronger 
presumptions in favour of anonymous speech, particularly on patently political issues. 
Barendt joins Scalia in emphasising the public interest in knowing the identity of speakers in 
order to assess their credibility; but can an audience not factor in anonymity when assessing 
speakers’ credibility?  
Such line-drawing problems are the stuff of predictable disagreement, but Barendt 




does take seriously the views at odds with his own. As new electronic media continue to 
confront legislatures and courts with difficult problems of anonymity, this thought-provoking 
book illuminates the diversity and complexity of issues that will require attention into the 
foreseeable future. 
 
